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848 
Comments 
SURVIVING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:  
HOW MARYLAND CAN SQUARE ITS RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LAWS WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
ANNE HAVEMANN∗
The renewable energy industry is booming.  Worldwide, compa-
nies invested $260 billion in clean energy last year.
 
1  Nearly $56 bil-
lion of that investment occurred in the United States.2  Individual 
states have also begun to latch onto the promise of renewable energy.  
Twenty-nine states, including Maryland, have mandatory renewable 
energy laws, known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPSs”).3
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 1. Press Release, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Solar Surge Drives Record Clean 
Energy Investment in 2011 (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.bnef.com/PressRe-
leases/view/180.   
 2. Id.  
 3. The twenty-nine mandatory state RPSs are: (1) Arizona Renewable Energy Stan-
dard and Tariff, ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE 14-2-18 (2010); (2) California Renewables Portfolio 
Standard Program, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (West 2011); (3) Colorado Renewable 
Energy Standard, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); (4) Con-
necticut Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a (West 
2007); (5) Delaware Renewable Portfolio Standards Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 351–64 
(West 2009); (6) Hawaii Renewable Portfolio Standards, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 269-91 et seq. 
(West 2011); (7) Illinois Renewable Portfolio Standard, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855 / 
1-75(c)(1) (West 2008); (8) Iowa Alternate Energy Production Facilities, IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 476.41--476.48 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); (9) Kansas Renewable Energy Standards Act, 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1256 to 66-1262 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); (10) Maine Renewable 
Portfolio Requirements, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210(3)-(3-A) (2011); (11) Mary-
land Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. UTIL. §§ 7-701 et seq. 
(LexisNexis 2011); (12) Massachusetts Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard for Retail 
Electricity Suppliers, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2010); (13) Michigan 
Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 460.1001 et seq. 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); (14) Minnesota Renewable Energy Standard, MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 216B.1691 (West 2010); (15) Missouri Renewable Energy Standard, MO. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 393.1025, 393.1030 (West 2011); (16) Montana Renewable Power Production and Rural 
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These laws require that a portion of a state’s energy consumption de-
rive from renewable energy and are a significant driver of the renew-
able energy boom.  A 2010 study, for example, estimated that state 
RPS policies will spur a 250 percent increase in renewable energy 
generation by 2025.4
At a time when the United States is realizing the consequences of 
decades of reliance on fossil fuels such as coal and oil, developing re-
newable energy is particularly critical.  The reality of this reliance was 
highlighted in April 2010 when an explosion at a coal mine in West 
Virginia killed twenty-nine miners.
   
5  Fifteen days later,6
 
Economic Development Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-2001 et seq. (2011); (17) Nevada 
Portfolio Standard, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7821 (West 2009); (18) New Hampshire 
Electric Renewable Portfolio Standard, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F (LexisNexis 2011); 
(19) New Jersey Renewable Portfolio Standards, N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-2.1 (2011); (20) 
New Mexico Renewable Portfolio Standard, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-15-34 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2011); (21) New York Renewable Portfolio Standard, N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N 
ORDER, CASE 03-E-0188, ORDER APPROVING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, ADOPTING 
CLARIFICATIONS, AND MODIFYING ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE PROGRAM (2004); (22) 
North Carolina Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 62-133.8 (West 2011); (23) Ohio Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard, OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE 4901:1-40 (2011); (24) Oregon Renewable Portfolio Standards, OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 496A (West 2011); (25) Pennsylvania Alternative Energy Portfolio Act, 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648 (West 2008); (26) Rhode Island Long-Term Contracting Stan-
dard for Renewable Energy, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 39-26.1 (West 2006); (27) Texas Goal 
for Renewable Energy, TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (West 2007); (28) Washington 
Energy Independence Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.285.010—.080 (West 2007); (29) 
Wisconsin Renewable Resources, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.378 (West 1992).  
 a BP-owned 
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico malfunctioned, triggering the 
The District of Columbia also has a mandatory renewable energy standard. D.C. Re-
newable Energy Portfolio Standards, D.C. CODE §§ 34-1431 et seq. (2011).  
Eight states—Indiana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Ver-
mont, and West Virginia—have nonbinding goals for adoption of renewable energy in-
stead of an RPS.  RPS Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 (last updated 
Aug. 2011).   
 4. Press Release, IHS, IHS Study: State RPS Policies Will Drive 250% Increase in Re-
newable Energy Generation by 2025 (June 30, 2010), available at 
http://press.ihs.com/press-release/ehs-sustainability/ihs-study-state-rps-policies-will-drive-
250-increase-renewable-ener.  
 5. See, e.g., Bernie Becker, West Virginia Coal Towns Mourn the Miners Lost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/us11mourn. 
html?ref=miningdisasters.  
 6. The West Virginia coal mine explosion occurred on April 5, 2010.  Ian Urbina, Toll 
Mounts in West Virginia Coal Mine Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/us/06westvirginia.html. The BP drilling rig ex-
ploded on April 20, 2010.  Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/ 
09bp.html. 
 850 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:848 
“greatest environmental disaster of its kind in [American] history.”7  
These two catastrophes, within the same month, only added to the 
growing sense that our nation’s energy policy needs reform.8  While 
the debate continues over the exact effects of burning coal and oil for 
energy, no credible scientist doubts that fossil fuels cause air and wa-
ter pollution, and few dispute the energy sources’ contribution to 
climate change.9  In addition, traditional energy sources are finite 
and are often imported from volatile countries.10
State RPSs therefore represent a vital policy tool to ease the tran-
sition away from traditional energy.  The laws, however, are a work in 
progress.  The RPSs are open to challenges under the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Commerce Clause because many of them favor renewable 
energy produced in-state or within a defined region.
 
11  Lawsuits have 
already arisen in two states.  In Massachusetts, a large energy company 
filed suit alleging that the state’s RPS impeded its ability to compete 
fairly within Massachusetts.12  In response, Massachusetts struck a por-
tion of its law13 and reached a partial settlement with the company.14
 
 7. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President After Meeting with BP 
Oil Spill Commission Co-Chairs (June 1, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/remarks-president-after-meeting-with-bp-oil-spill-commission-co-chairs.  
  
 8. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Adam Nagourney, Bush: ‘America is Addicted to Oil’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/world/americas/ 
01iht-state.html (explaining that in his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush 
(who was not known to oppose traditional forms of energy) declared that “America is ad-
dicted to oil” and set a goal of replacing 75 percent of the nation’s Mideast oil imports 
with alternative energy sources by 2025).  
 9. See, for example, the most recent report by the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”), a scientific body considered the leading international organiza-
tion on climate science, which concludes with “very high confidence” that humans have 
caused most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
twentieth century.  Richard B. Alley et al., Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007).  But see 
the findings of a MIT meteorology professor, Richard S. Lindzen, who argues that confi-
dent predictions of climate catastrophe are unwarranted.  Richard S. Lindzen, Op-Ed, The 
Climate Science Isn’t Settled, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2009, 7:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748703939404574567423917025400.html.  
 10. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, Will the Iran Sanctions Spark an International Oil Crisis?,  
ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2012/01/will-the-iran-sanctions-spark-an-international-oil-crisis/251094/ (explaining how 
sanctions against oil-rich Iran for its nuclear program threaten to create an international 
oil crisis).   
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also infra Part I.A (explaining the Commerce 
Clause). 
 12. Complaint, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 16, 2010). 
 13. See Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, D.P.U. 10-58 (Mass. Dep’t of Pub. 
Utils. June 9, 2010) (revising 220 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 17.00 et seq.). 
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Less than a year after this challenge, a conservative advocacy group 
filed suit in federal court asserting that Colorado’s renewable energy 
laws violated the Commerce Clause.15  Although that case is still pend-
ing,16 the group is already preparing for new challenges.17  If it wins in 
Colorado, the organization plans to target renewable energy laws in 
other states.18
Maryland has had an RPS since 2004 and is among the states vul-
nerable to potential challenges.
   
19  Its renewable energy policies will 
only draw more scrutiny if it becomes one of the first states to pursue 
offshore wind development.20  Because Maryland’s law favors renewa-
ble energy generated within a defined region, a court could find that 
certain provisions of Maryland’s law are unconstitutional.21  Although 
courts could overlook the constitutional defects of the RPS by focus-
ing on the benefits of renewable energy, they are more likely to find 
that Maryland could continue to receive the benefits of renewable 
energy through less discriminatory means.22  State renewable energy 
laws like Maryland’s are too vital a policy tool to risk having them 
overturned by a court.  Given the recent challenges to state RPSs, 
Maryland should consider taking steps today to preempt possible at-
tacks.23
 
 14. Email from Dwayne Breger, Dir., Renewable and Alternative Energy Development, 
Mass. Dep’t of Energy Resources, to stakeholders, TransCanada and Massachusetts Settle-
ment Announcement (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.nepoolgis.com/GeneralDoc 
/Archive.asp (Program Update Archived). 
  While overhauling the entire RPS is far from necessary, Mary-
land can follow Massachusetts’s lead and amend the most constitu-
 15. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief, Am. Tradition 
Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).  
 16. Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 3705108, at 
*3 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2011) (granting a stay of all proceedings).  
 17. ATI Environmental Law Center v. State of Colorado Renewables Mandate—Pt. 3, Possible 
Outcomes, AM. TRADITION INST. (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.atinstitute.org/ati-
environmental-law-center-v-state-of-colorado-renewables-mandate-%E2%80%93-pt-3-
possible-outcomes/ [hereinafter Possible Outcomes] (declaring that the American Tradition 
Institute is “putting wind on trial”).  
 18. Id. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.2.c.  
 20. Press Release, Office of Governor Martin O’Malley, Governor O’Malley Introduces 
the Maryland Offshore Wind Energy Act of 2011 (Feb. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/110211b.asp.  
 21. See infra Part II.A.1 (arguing that provisions of Maryland’s RPS are unconstitution-
al); see also infra Part II.A.2 (arguing that the broad RPS system is constitutional).  
 22. See infra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 23. Although the federal government could also take action, this Comment will focus 
on actions Maryland can take to ensure its renewable energy laws are not struck down as 
unconstitutional.  For a brief discussion of steps the federal government should take, see 
infra note 247. 
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tionally suspect provisions without significantly affecting the purpose 
of the law.24
I.  BACKGROUND 
   
Although constitutional challenges to renewable energy laws are 
relatively new, the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
dates back to the early nineteenth century.25  A court would therefore 
analyze any challenge to Maryland’s RPS against the Court’s historic 
understanding of the Commerce Clause.26  The Court’s more recent 
decisions in cases involving Commerce Clause challenges to energy-
related laws are also useful when determining how a court would eva-
luate Maryland’s law.27  While a detailed description of U.S. energy 
regulation is not within the scope of this Comment, a basic under-
standing of RPS legislation is helpful.28  The structure of and chal-
lenges to the renewable energy laws in Massachusetts29 and Colora-
do30 reveal the types of policies that invite constitutional scrutiny.  
Finally, an overview of Maryland’s RPS is necessary to determine the 
success of any potential challenge.31
A.  Commerce Clause Overview 
  
The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have Pow-
er . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several states . . . .”32  
The Supreme Court has found that the clause grants Congress the 
exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce.33  In addition, 
the Court has long held that the clause prohibits states from unduly 
burdening interstate commerce, even in the absence of federal regu-
lation.34
 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
  This “negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause is referred to 
 25. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 76–79 (1824) (interpreting the Com-
merce Clause). 
 26. See infra Part I.A.  
 27. See infra Part I.A.  
 28. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 29. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 30. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 31. See infra Part I.B.2.c. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Constitution also grants Congress the authority to 
regulate foreign commerce.  Id.  
 33. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 180 (1824) (“[T]he power to regulate 
commerce [i]s exclusively vested in Congress.”). 
 34. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (“[T]he 
Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among 
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as the dormant Commerce Clause.35  The purpose of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is to prevent states from interfering with the flow 
of commerce for their own economic benefit.36  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly interpreted the clause as “invalidat[ing] local laws that 
impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of 
commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of state.”37
The dormant Commerce Clause applies to laws that discriminate 
on their face as well as facially neutral laws with discriminatory ef-
fects.
 
38  Determining the type of discrimination is critical because fa-
cially discriminatory laws are subject to stricter scrutiny than laws that 
merely have discriminatory effects.39
1.  Facially Discriminatory Laws Receive Strict Scrutiny 
   
Facially discriminatory laws differentiate between articles of 
commerce based solely on their geographic origins.40  This disparate 
treatment violates the Commerce Clause, which is meant to ensure 
that a product’s presence in the market is attributable solely to mar-
ket forces.41
 
the States, but also directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate 
commerce.”). 
  Facially discriminatory laws can take a number of forms, 
 35. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (referring to the negative aspect of the clause as the “dormant” Commerce 
Clause).  In addition to the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, which governs com-
merce between states, the Court has also read a negative aspect into the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, which governs commerce between states and foreign countries.  See Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1979) (distinguishing the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause from the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause).  For ease of 
reference, this Comment will refer to the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause simply as 
the dormant Commerce Clause.   
 36. See, e.g., Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273–74 (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burden-
ing out-of-state competitors”). 
 37. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390. 
 38. See infra Part I.A.  Courts also recognize two exceptions to the dormant Commerce 
Clause: the “market participant” exception and instances where Congress has explicitly 
authorized the discrimination.  See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 
204, 208 (1983) (“[W]hen a state or local government enters the market as a participant it 
is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.”); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Manag-
ers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) (explaining that Congress can “confer[] upon the States 
an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy”).  
A detailed description of these exceptions is not necessary for purposes of this Comment. 
 39. See infra Part I.A.   
 40. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (striking down a New 
Jersey law that blocked the import of waste from other states).  
 41. See, e.g., id. at 626–27 (“[W]hatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the 
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”).  
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but generally fall into three categories: (1) laws that set up interstate 
barriers to commerce; (2) laws that manipulate the price of out-of-
state versus in-state goods; and (3) laws that attempt to regulate out-
of-state conduct.    
State laws that create barriers to commerce by blocking imports 
or exports of goods across state lines violate the Commerce Clause.42  
Not only are laws that hinder commerce from one state to another 
considered unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court has also held 
that statutes that set up regional barriers and discriminate against 
some states rather than all states violate the Commerce Clause.43  
Courts have recently struck down energy-related laws that create bar-
riers to interstate commerce.  For example, the Court overturned a 
New Hampshire law prohibiting hydroelectric plants from selling 
power out of state before offering it for sale within the state.44
In addition to laws that set up interstate barriers to commerce, 
state laws that manipulate the price of goods because of their origins 
are also invalid.  These laws generally take the form of added taxes 
and charges on out-of-state goods.
 
45  For example, the Court struck 
down an Ohio law that offered a tax credit to fuel dealers who sold 
ethanol that was either produced in Ohio or in a state that granted 
reciprocal tax advantages.46
 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 628 (“The New Jersey law . . . falls squarely within the area that the 
Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation.  On its face, it imposes on out-of-state 
commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State’s remaining landfill space.”).  
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court struck down an Alaska regu-
lation requiring that all Alaska timber be processed within the state before export.  467 
U.S. 82, 100 (1984).  Faced with a similar issue a decade later, the Court struck down a 
town ordinance requiring non-recyclable solid waste to be processed at designated facility 
within the municipality before shipping.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 
394–95 (1994). 
   
 43. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 353 (1977) (striking 
down a law that banned the sale of apples in North Carolina from any states with a grading 
system other than USDA even though the law precluded sales from some but not all 
states). 
 44. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 344 (1982) (hold-
ing that a law restricting exports of hydropower hoards resources for a state’s economic 
advantage).  The Court also struck down an Oklahoma law requiring in-state plants to 
burn a mixture of coal containing at least 10 percent Oklahoma-mined coal.   Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443, 455 (1992).  In Illinois, a court declared unconstitutional a 
law that encouraged the use of in-state coal by ensuring that coal plants burning sulfur-
heavy coal would meet Clean Air Act requirements.  Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 
F.3d 591, 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1995).   
 45. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) (invalidat-
ing an Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).  
 46. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271–80 (1988).  
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Finally, laws that attempt to regulate the conduct of out-of-state 
businesses also violate the dormant Commerce Clause.47  Many of 
these laws tie the price of goods to the price charged in other states, 
which may have the practical effect of regulating what interstate sel-
lers can charge in those other states.48  Other impermissible laws re-
gulate the in-state market for a product that is manufactured solely 
outside the state.49  Courts take the cumulative effect of these laws in-
to account, reasoning that if one state is allowed to enact a law regu-
lating out-of-state business, other states could impose similar laws, 
which would have a stifling overall effect on interstate commerce and 
the economy.50
State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce on their 
face trigger strict scrutiny and are considered virtually per se invalid.
 
51  
Courts review facially discriminatory laws under a two-part strict scru-
tiny standard, asking (1) whether the law advances a legitimate local 
purpose; and, if so, (2) whether that purpose can be adequately 
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.52
 
 47. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (1989) (striking down a law 
requiring certification that the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-
state). 
  The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that protecting the environment and public 
 48. See id. at 338 (finding that a Connecticut law, which required beer sellers to affirm 
that their Connecticut prices were no higher than the lowest price charged in a bordering 
state, had “the extraterritorial effect . . . of preventing brewers from undertaking competi-
tive pricing in” one of the bordering states).  
 49. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, 2011 
WL 6934797, at *2–3, 13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) (concluding that California’s Low Car-
bon Fuel Standard impermissibly controlled conduct outside of California’s borders be-
cause the law, which favored certain types of ethanol over others, in effect regulated the 
manufacture of ethanol—a process that occurs almost entirely outside of California). 
 50. See, e.g., Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (“[T]he practical effect of the statute must be eva-
luated . . . by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regu-
latory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, 
State adopted similar legislation.”).  
 51. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“[W]here simple 
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity 
has been erected.”).  But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (upholding a facial-
ly discriminatory law because Maine’s interest in banning out-of-state baitfish was consi-
dered legitimate).  
 52. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) 
(“[T]he [law] must be invalidated unless . . . it advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”); Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“[F]acial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny 
of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alter-
natives.”).  This test is a somewhat modified version of the traditional strict scrutiny stan-
dard, which requires laws to be “narrowly tailored . . . to further compelling governmental 
interests.”  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
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health are legitimate goals.53  In contrast, it does not consider a law 
aimed at helping struggling local industries to be legitimate, as such a 
law advances a purely economic end.54  The lack-of-alternatives excep-
tion is also extremely narrow.  Only one facially discriminatory law has 
ever successfully invoked the exception.55
2.   Facially Neutral Laws with Discriminatory Effects Trigger a 
Balancing Test 
 
When a statute does not discriminate on its face, but instead im-
poses only incidental burdens on interstate commerce, courts use a 
balancing approach to determine whether the burdens outweigh the 
benefits of the law.  The analysis, announced by the Court in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., weighs the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce against the statute’s local benefits.56
Since Pike, courts have found that some local benefits, such as 
improving environmental health and safety, justify a burden on com-
merce.  In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., for example, the Su-
preme Court upheld a Minnesota statute banning the use of envi-
ronmentally harmful plastic milk containers by both in-state and out-
of-state sellers.
   
57  The Court reasoned that “[a] nondiscriminatory 
regulation serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply be-
cause it causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-
state industry to a predominantly in-state industry.  Only if the burden 
on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State’s legitimate pur-
poses does such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause.”58
 
 53. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (acknowledging that a 
state has an “unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people”). 
  Like-
wise, in United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
 54. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984) (“[W]e perceive no prin-
ciple of Commerce Clause jurisprudence supporting a distinction between thriving and 
struggling enterprises . . . .  [Regardless,] the legislation constitutes ‘economic protection-
ism’ in every sense of the phrase.”); see also United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (“[R]evenue generation is not a local 
interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce . . . .” (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  
 55. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151–52 (upholding Maine’s statute banning the importation of 
out-of-state baitfish into Maine waters because no alternatives existed to protect domestic 
population from disease). 
 56. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inciden-
tal, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
 57. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–74 (1981). 
 58. Id. at 474.  
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Management Authority, the Court examined a flow-control ordinance 
that required trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a particular waste 
processing facility.59  The Court applied the Pike balancing test, con-
cluding that the benefits of the ordinance—creating an effective way 
to finance waste disposal services and increasing recycling—
outweighed the incidental burdens on interstate commerce.60
In some cases, however, facially neutral statutes are so clearly a 
ruse for protectionist behavior that courts have invalidated the laws 
without even reaching the Pike balancing test.
  
61  Although courts do 
not dispute that states have the right to protect public health and the 
environment, when states pass a discriminatory law under the guise of 
protecting their citizens, courts carefully scrutinize the law’s declared 
purpose.  In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, for example, the Su-
preme Court considered a law that gave favorable tax treatment to 
ethanol produced in-state and, its proponents claimed, also protected 
the state’s environment.62  The Court acknowledged that protecting 
health is a legitimate state goal but easily concluded that health was 
“merely an occasional and accidental effect of achieving [the law’s 
main] purpose,” which was to benefit in-state ethanol producers.63
By contrast, some state laws that appear at first blush to have dis-
criminatory effects on interstate commerce do not discriminate at all.  
The Maryland case Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland
  
64 provides an 
example.  There, a Maryland statute barred petroleum refiners from 
operating any retail service station within the State.65  Since Maryland 
had no petroleum refiners, the burden of the law fell entirely on in-
terstate companies.66
 
 59. 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007). 
  Despite the seemingly discriminatory impact of 
the law, the Court found no Commerce Clause violation, explaining 
that “[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some in-
 60. Id. at 346.  Although the Court emphasized that “revenue generation is not a local 
interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce,” it considered revenue 
generation “a cognizable benefit for purposes of the Pike test.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 61. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 107–08 
(1994) (explaining that characterizing the surcharge on in-state disposal of out-of-state 
waste as “resource protectionism” did not validate the discriminatory statute). 
 62. 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279 (1988). 
 63. Id. at 279. 
 64. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).  
 65. Id. at 119.  The statute also required any producer or refiner of petroleum prod-
ucts to “extend all ‘voluntary allowances’ uniformly to all service stations it supplies.”  Id. at 
119–20.  
 66. Id. at 125. 
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terstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce.”67
B.  Overview of State Renewable Energy Laws and Challenges 
  
All twenty-nine states with RPSs—including Massachusetts, Colo-
rado, and Maryland—have shaped their laws in accordance with one 
of two basic structures of RPS legislation.68  After settling on the 
broad outline of an RPS, states often incorporate additional mechan-
isms and incentives that can affect how the law stands up to constitu-
tional scrutiny.  Thus, the structures of specific state RPSs provide vi-
tal insight into how a court would analyze the Maryland RPS.  The 
Massachusetts RPS provides the first example explored in this sec-
tion.69  Since Massachusetts presents the only case in which a chal-
lenge to a state RPS has been resolved, the outcome of that challenge 
is described in detail.70  The structure of the Colorado RPS and the 
challenge to that law provide the second example in this section.71  
Finally, this section concludes by outlining the structure of the Mary-
land RPS.72
1.  The Basics of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
  
An RPS is a state policy that obligates each retail seller of electric-
ity to offer “a certain amount of electricity from renewable energy re-
sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and various forms of 
biomass and ocean energy.”73  When shaping the RPS obligation, 
states have two options: (1) require electricity suppliers to maintain 
energy derived from renewable sources in their own energy portfolio; 
or (2) allow suppliers to meet their renewable energy obligations by 
purchasing tradable renewable energy credits (“RECs”).74  Under the 
first structure, a facility must physically interconnect with the state or 
regional electricity system to satisfy the RPS requirement.75
 
 67. Id. at 126. 
  These sys-
 68. See infra Part I.B.1 (describing the basics of RPS legislation).  
 69. See infra Part I.B.2.a.  
 70. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 71. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 72. See infra Part I.B.2.c. 
 73. NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2001).   
 74. Id. at 2. “The word ‘portfolio’ refers to the mix of power supply resources that a 
retail seller assembles to serve its customers.”  Id. 
 75. Patrick Jacobi, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How 
States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 
1090 (2006).   
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tems are referred to as “bundled” because the attributes of renewable 
energy are bundled with electricity and sold together.76  Under the 
second framework, retailers can “trade” their obligation; instead of 
maintaining renewable energy in their own energy portfolios, they 
need only demonstrate that someone else has generated the required 
amount of renewable energy.77  In these cases, renewable energy 
attributes are “unbundled” from electricity and traded as RECs.78
Renewable Portfolio Standards that require bundled energy and 
attributes are based on contracts between a supplier and a consumer 
of electricity.
  
79  Two types of contracts exist: “the ‘power pool’ ar-
rangement and the bilateral contract.”80   In the power pool ar-
rangement, various electricity providers enter into short-term con-
tracts to contribute electrons to one central pool.81  A regional 
transmission organization (“RTO”) or an independent system opera-
tor (“ISO”) coordinates power transmission decisions within the pool 
to ensure that the supply of electricity meets demand.82
 
 76. See EDWARD A. HOLT & RYAN H. WISER, THE TREATMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CERTIFICATES, EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES, AND GREEN POWER PROGRAMS IN STATE 
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 3 (2007) (mentioning electricity and its “bundled 
attributes” and explaining that attributes can be unbundled from the underlying electrici-
ty and traded separately).  
  Power pools 
can be quite large; the RTO that operates the Mid-Atlantic power 
pool, for example, supplies power to all or parts of thirteen states and 
 77. See id. (“A second approach is to unbundle the attributes from the underlying elec-
tricity and allow them to be traded as RECs.  Verification of compliance can then take 
place by examining the number of RECs owned and retired by the obligated entities.”). 
 78. Id.  
 79. See id. (mentioning a “chain of custody” in contracts for electricity and their bun-
dled attributes, where “the generating units and their attributes are specified”).  
 80. Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1093.  
 81. See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOPMENT, COGENERATION, 
UTILITY REGULATION § 10:3.1 (West 2005) (1989) (“Generators bid for the right to supply 
bulk electricity at wholesale through a process specifying price and quantity.  The offers 
are aggregated and a system-wide price is established.  All offers to supply power below this 
price are then accepted by the pool.”).  
 82. RTOs or ISOs operate a regional power pool.  See JOHN CHANDLEY, HOW RTOS SET 
SPOT MARKET PRICES (AND HOW THIS HELPS TO KEEP THE LIGHTS ON) 1 n.2, 15 (2007), 
available at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/spot-market-prices-j-
chandley.ashx (using RTOs and ISOs interchangeably).  The difference between an RTO 
and an ISO is that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does not regulate the size 
of the region the ISO serves.  PJM’s Role in the Energy Industry: FAQs, PJM.COM, 
http://pjm.com/Home/about-pjm/learning-center/pjm-overview/pjms-role-in-energy-
industry.aspx?faq={035A1DB7-4C51-4E9F-8E59-2007D89FE794} (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).  
For additional background on RTOs and ISOs, see generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., 
ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 860–77 (2006).   
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the District of Columbia.83  Under the power pool arrangement, it is 
difficult to trace the path the electricity will take.84  In contrast, a bila-
teral contract is a direct contract between a power producer and a us-
er or broker outside of the centralized power pool and leaves no 
question of where an electron will arrive.85
The alternative to bundled energy and attributes is a REC-based 
system.  This type of RPS involves a trading scheme where utilities can 
purchase renewable electricity without the costs associated with “pro-
duction, interconnection, and transmission.”
   
86  Under this scheme, 
“instead of having to generate or buy renewable energy, retail [elec-
tricity] sellers . . . purchase RECs from renewable energy producers 
and submit them once each year to the [state] program administrator 
in amounts equal to the required percentage of the total electricity 
sales.”87
2.  Specific State RPS Legislation and Related Litigation 
  
a.  Massachusetts 
In 1997, Massachusetts enacted an RPS and chose to use a REC-
based system.88  Under the Massachusetts RPS, 15 percent of the 
energy supplied to Massachusetts customers must come from renewa-
ble sources by 2020.89  An electricity supplier may meet this obligation 
in part through purchasing RECs from qualified suppliers.90
In 2008, the Massachusetts legislature significantly revisited its 
RPS by enacting the Green Communities Act.
   
91
 
 83. About PJM: Who We Are, PJM.COM, http://pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx 
(last updated Jan. 3, 2012).  
  Section 83 of the 
Green Communities Act required electric distribution companies to 
enter into long-term contracts with generators of renewable energy 
 84. See RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 73, at 34 (“While the customer can contract to 
pay for electricity from a specific generator, that generator’s output will flow into the grid 
and commingle with the output of all other generators in the grid.”). 
 85. FERREY, supra note 81, at 1, app. B.  
 86. See Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1091 (explaining the benefits of a REC-based system).    
 87. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. 1997 Mass. Acts 874.  
 89. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.07 (2007). 
 90. See id. (allowing utilities to meet the RPS through “New Renewable Generation 
Attributes”); id. 14.02 (defining “New Renewable Generation Attributes” as “[t]he Genera-
tion Attribute of the electrical energy output of a specific Generation Unit that derives 
from the Unit’s production of New Renewable Generation”).  For a description of RECs, 
see supra Part I.B.1.   
 91. 2008 Mass. Acts 308.  
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located in Massachusetts.92
If any provision of this section is subject to a judicial chal-
lenge, the department of public utilities may suspend the 
applicability of the challenged provision during the penden-
cy of the judicial action until final resolution of the chal-
lenge and any appeals, and shall issue such orders and take 
such other actions as are necessary to ensure that the provi-
sions that are not challenged are implemented expeditiously 
to achieve the public purposes of this provision.
  As if anticipating a challenge, Section 83 
further provided: 
93
Section 32 of the Green Communities Act added a provision to the 
RPS requiring electricity suppliers to purchase RECs from generation 
units located in Massachusetts.
 
94  Acting pursuant to this authority, 
the Massachusetts Division of Energy Resources, added a solar “carve-
out” requiring each electricity supplier to meet a portion of its renew-
able energy quota from solar generators in Massachusetts.95
TransCanada, a significant developer and producer of renewable 
energy in the United States and Canada,
 
96 challenged both portions 
of the Green Communities Act as discriminatory on their face.  The 
company argued that Section 83 prevented it “from bidding to fulfill 
the required long-term contracts by offering renewable energy gener-
ated outside Massachusetts, including renewable energy from the 
Kibby Wind Power Project [in Maine].”97  The company claimed that 
the requirements “harm[ed] the public of Massachusetts by increas-
ing prices for renewable energy by prohibiting” TransCanada and 
other out-of-state generators from competing for the long-term con-
tracts in Massachusetts.98
 
 92. See id. at 365 (“[E]ach distribution company . . . shall be required . . . to . . . enter 
into cost-effective long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of renewable energy gen-
eration within the jurisdictional boundaries of the commonwealth . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
  In response to TransCanada’s lawsuit, and 
 93. Id. 
 94. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F(g) (West 2010).  The RPS stated that:  
In satisfying its annual obligations under [the RPS program], each retail supplier 
shall provide a portion of the required minimum percentage of kilowatt-hours 
sales from new on-site renewable energy generating sources located in the com-
monwealth . . . .  [T]he department may specify that a certain percentage of 
these requirements shall be met through energy generated from a specific tech-
nology or fuel type.   
Id. 
 95. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(4)(a) (2011). 
 96. Complaint at ¶ 16, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). 
 97. Id. ¶ 25. 
 98. Id. ¶ 26. 
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pursuant to its authority under Section 83, the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Utilities eliminated the requirement limiting the 
availability of long-term contracts to in-state renewable resources.99
TransCanada also challenged the solar carve-out created under 
Section 32.  The company argued that “[w]ere it not for the discrimi-
nation in favor of Massachusetts generation units, Solar RECs would 
develop in a broader geographic area . . . and they would reach rea-
sonable price points more quickly.”
 
100
As in the existing REC program, the environmental benefits 
of the Solar RECs will be experienced in every location that 
is affected by traditional power plants generating power for 
the power grid operated by ISO New England.  These may 
include power plants located in other control areas.  There 
is no reason that the solar generators must be located in 
Massachusetts in order to create and to verify “the positive 
environmental attributes associated with this clean energy 
production.”
  Addressing Massachusetts’s ar-
gument that the solar requirement was meant to further a legitimate 
environmental purpose, the company explained: 
101
In May 2010, Massachusetts and TransCanada agreed to settle 
this portion of the lawsuit.
 
102  Energy suppliers that had contracts with 
Massachusetts on or prior to January 1, 2010, including TransCanada, 
can now meet their portion of the solar renewable energy obligation 
with out-of-state solar energy sources.103
b.  Colorado 
 
In 2004, Colorado became the first state in the nation to enact an 
RPS by ballot measure.104
 
 99. Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, D.P.U. 10-58 (Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utils. 
June 9, 2010), revising 220 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 17.00 et seq. 
  Like Massachusetts, the state allows energy 
suppliers to use tradable RECs to meet their renewable energy obliga-
 100. Complaint at ¶ 42, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). 
 101. Id. ¶ 37. 
 102. Email from Dwayne Breger, Dir., Renewable and Alternative Energy Development, 
Mass. Dep’t of Energy Resources, to stakeholders, TransCanada and Massachusetts Settle-
ment Announcement (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.nepoolgis.comgeneral 
Doc/Archive.asp/ (Program Updates). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Jesse Broehl, Colorado Voters Pass Renewable Energy Standard, 
RENEWABLEENERGYACCESS.COM (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2004/11/colorado-voters-pass-renewable-energy-standard-17736.  
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tions.105  In 2010, Colorado revised its RPS by increasing the amount 
of renewable energy that utilities were required to procure from 20 to 
30 percent by 2020.106  The 30-percent-by-2020 mandate applies to all 
providers of retail electric service in Colorado except for municipally 
owned utilities that serve 40,000 customers or fewer and unregulated 
electric associations.107
The law allows for a regional system of tradable RECs, as long as 
the trading utility uses the same definition of renewable energy as 
Colorado.
    
108  To meet its renewable-energy requirement, Colorado 
favors certain types of energy sources by inflating their compliance 
value.  For example, the RPS counts every kilowatt-hour of renewable 
energy produced within the state as 1.25 kilowatt-hours of eligible 
energy.109  To further promote solar energy, the RPS requires utilities 
other than cooperative electric associations and municipally owned 
utilities to offer a rebate to customers who install solar electric gener-
ation on their premises.110  Finally, to stimulate rural economic devel-
opment, the law doubles the regulatory compliance value of renewa-
ble sources if they interconnect to electric transmission or 
distribution facilities owned by a cooperative electric association or 
municipally owned utility.111
 
 105. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).  The Colorado 
RPS requires unbundled RECs.  HOLT & WISER, supra note 
  
76, at 5 table 1.  For a descrip-
tion of RECs, see supra Part I.B.1. 
 106. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I)(E). 
 107. Id. § 40-2-124(1).  These excluded providers must generate 10 percent of their 
energy from renewable sources by 2020.  Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(V). 
 108. See id. § 40-2-124(1)(d) (“The commission shall not restrict the qualifying retail 
utility’s ownership of renewable energy credits if the qualifying retail utility . . . uses defini-
tions of eligible energy resources that are limited to those identified in paragraph (a) [de-
fining renewable energy] of this subsection . . . .”). 
 109. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3654(e) (2010) (“For purposes of compliance with 
the renewable energy standard, each kilowatt-hour of eligible energy generated in Colora-
do, other than retail renewable distributed generation, shall be counted as 1.25 kilowatt-
hours of eligible energy.”).  The RPS also favors “community-based projects,” defined as 
“project[s] located in Colorado,” and counts each kilowatt-hour of electricity from renew-
able resources at these community-based projects as 1.5 kilowatt-hours.  COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(VI) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).  Municipally owned and cooperative 
electric associations may count one kilowatt-hour of solar energy as three kilowatt-hours.  
Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(VII)(A). 
 110. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124(1)(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 111. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(IX) (“[E]ach kilowatt hour of electricity generated from re-
newable energy resources that interconnects to electric transmission or distribution facili-
ties owned by a cooperative electric association or municipally owned utility may be 
counted . . . as two kilowatt hours . . . .”). 
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Under the RPS, renewable distributed generation (“DG”) must 
comprise 3 percent of retail electricity sales by 2020.112  Distributed 
generation is comprised of either retail DG or wholesale DG.113  The 
statute defines retail DG as “a renewable energy resource that is lo-
cated on the site of a customer’s facilities and is interconnected on 
the customer’s side of the utility meter.”114  Wholesale DG is defined 
as “a renewable energy resource in Colorado with a nameplate rating of 
thirty megawatts or less and that does not qualify as retail distributed 
generation.”115  At least one-half of a utility’s DG requirements must 
be met by retail DG.116
Finally, the law relieves Colorado utilities from complying with 
the competitive bidding requirements of the Colorado Public Utility 
Commission.
 
117  To protect consumers from rising energy prices, the 
RPS contains a “retail rate impact rule,” effectively limiting the 
amount of eligible energy resources and renewable energy credits a 
utility may acquire.118
In April 2011, the American Tradition Institute (“ATI”), a con-
servative Washington-based non-profit dedicated to advancing free-
market solutions, challenged Colorado’s RPS as violating the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  In its complaint, ATI not only challenged the fa-
cially discriminatory portions of Colorado’s law, as TransCanada did 
in Massachusetts, but also argued that Colorado’s entire RPS is un-
constitutional because it “discriminates on its face against legal, safer, 
less costly, less polluting and more reliable in-state and out-of-state 
generators of electricity sold in interstate commerce.”
  
119
 
 112. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I)(E). 
  The advoca-
cy group advanced three main arguments.  First, ATI described its 
 113. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(a)(II). 
 114. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(a)(V). 
 115. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(a)(VI) (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(II)(A). 
 117. Id. § 40-2-124(1)(f)(I).  The Colorado Public Utilities Commission oversees the 
Renewable Energy Standard.  See id. § 40-2-101 (establishing the Public Utilities Commis-
sion).   
 118. See id. § 40-2-124(1)(g)(I)(A)–(B) (“[T]he commission shall establish a maximum 
retail rate impact of this section of two percent of the total electric bill annually for each 
customer.  The retail rate impact shall be determined net of new alternative sources of 
electricity supply from noneligible energy sources that are reasonably available at the time 
of the determination. . . .  If the retail rate impact does not exceed the maximum impact 
permitted . . . the qualifying utility may acquire more than the minimum amount of eligi-
ble energy resources and renewable energy credits . . . .”). 
 119. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at ¶ 2, Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 
No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).  The complaint was also brought by 
the American Tradition Partnership and individual plaintiff Rod Lueck.  Id.  For ease of 
reference, this Comment will only refer to plaintiff American Tradition Institute. 
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constitutional claim, laying out the seven ways in which the RPS alle-
gedly discriminates against out-of-state-energy sources.120  Second, 
ATI questioned the benefits of renewable energy, arguing that renew-
able energy is unreliable,121 costly,122 and actually results in more pol-
lution since coal and natural gas plants must be powered up and 
down frequently to supplement the intermittent power from wind 
energy.123  Third, ATI argued that the purposes of the Colorado 
RPS124 could be more effectively achieved by promoting coal and nat-
ural gas.125
While ATI’s complaint contained seven challenges to the consti-
tutionality of the state RPS, only three of the arguments are applica-
ble to Maryland.  The first such argument is ATI’s broad claim that 
any renewable energy requirement burdens interstate commerce be-
cause it “bars a power source connected to the interstate grid from 
producing non-renewable power equivalent to the percentage of re-
newable energy required to meet the Colorado law.”
  
126  The second 
argument is ATI’s claim that the purpose of the RPS is facially discri-
minatory to electricity generators operating outside of Colorado.127  
The third argument is ATI’s claim that Colorado’s RPS impermissibly 
regulates out-of-state conduct by authorizing the use of tradable re-
newable energy credits but mandating that definitions of “renewable 
energy” be identical to those set out in the Colorado law.128
 
 120. Id. at Part II.A–G. 
   
 121. Id. at Part III.B. 
 122. Id. at Parts III.D, H. 
 123. Id. ¶ 90. 
 124. Colorado’s RPS was established in 2004 through a ballot initiative.  The ballot in-
itiative contained a declaration of legislative intent, which stated:  
[I]n order to save consumers and businesses money, attract new businesses and 
jobs, promote development of rural economies, minimize water use for electrici-
ty generation, diversify Colorado’s energy resources, reduce the impact of vola-
tile fuel prices, and improve the natural environment of the state, it is in the best 
interests of the citizens of Colorado to develop and utilize renewable energy re-
sources to the maximum practicable extent. 
Colo. Amendment 37, § 1 (2004). 
 125. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at Part III.I, Am. Tradition Inst. v. Col-
orado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011). 
 126. Id. ¶ 60. 
 127. Id. at Part II.B (see supra note 124 for the purpose of the Colorado law).   
 128. Id. ¶ 75.  In addition, ATI’s complaint contains six specific challenges that are less 
relevant for purposes of this Comment.  First, it challenges the in-state wholesale DG re-
quirement and the various multipliers favoring in-state renewable energy generation.  Id. 
at Part II.C.  Second, the organization claims that the regulation’s preference for solar 
energy “establish[es] a market-bias against otherwise non-renewable sources located out-
side of Colorado.”  Id. ¶ 73.  Third, ATI challenges the provision inflating the compliance 
value of renewable sources that interconnect to electric facilities owned by cooperative 
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The merit of these arguments is not known at this time because 
ATI’s suit is still pending.129
c.  Maryland 
 
Maryland enacted its RPS in 2004 and revisited it in 2007, 2008, 
and 2010.130  Under Maryland’s RPS, electricity suppliers must pro-
cure 20 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2022.131  
Electricity suppliers comply with the RPS requirements by acquiring 
RECs, which each represent one megawatt-hour (“MWh”) of defined 
renewable energy sources.132  The Maryland RPS includes an inter-
connection requirement: RPS-eligible facilities must be located within 
the geographic footprint of the PJM interconnection133 or in an adja-
cent control area if electricity is delivered into the PJM region.134
Maryland also imposes a solar-specific procurement target, com-
monly known as a solar carve-out: by 2022, 2 percent of RECs used to 
satisfy the Maryland RPS must come from solar energy.
   
135  Starting in 
2012, solar energy must be generated within Maryland’s electricity 
grid to satisfy Maryland’s RPS requirements.136
 
electric associations or municipally owned utilities.  Id. ¶ 74.  Fourth, ATI challenges the 
requirement that Colorado utilities must offer rebates to customers who install solar gene-
rating technologies on their premises.  Id. ¶ 76.  Fifth, ATI claims that because municipal 
and cooperative electric associations are not relieved from the competitive bidding re-
quirements of the Colorado Public Utility Commission rules, their ability to compete ef-
fectively in the interstate electricity market is diminished.  Id. ¶ 77. Sixth, the organization 
argues that the provision limiting the amount of eligible energy resources and renewable 
energy credits a qualifying utility may acquire is unconstitutional because it imposes on 
out-of-state companies a direct limitation on the sales of both renewable resources and 
renewable energy credits to certain Colorado utilities.  Id. ¶ 78. 
  Maryland also insti-
 129. Am, Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM, 2001 WL 3705108, at 
*3 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2011) (granting a stay of all proceedings). 
 130. Maryland: Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY (May 23, 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incen-
tive.cfm?Incentive_Code=MD05R&re=1&ee=1. 
 131. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-703(b)(17) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 132. See id. § 7-704(b) (allowing for RECs); see also id. § 7-701(i) (defining RECs).  The 
Maryland RPS requires unbundled RECs.  HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 5 table 1.  For a 
description of RECs, see supra Part I.B.1.   
 133. The PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates 
the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of thirteen Mid-Atlantic states and the 
District of Columbia.  About PJM: Who We Are, PJM.COM, http://pjm.com/about-pjm/who-
we-are.aspx (last updated Jan. 3, 2012).  
 134. PUB. UTIL. § 7-701(i)(1)–(2). 
 135. Id. § 7-703(b)(17). 
 136. Id. § 7-701(l)(1) (defining solar energy as a Tier 1 renewable source); id. § 7-
704(a)(2)(i)(1) (providing that beginning in 2012, solar energy is “eligible for inclusion 
in meeting the renewable energy portfolio standard only if the source is connected with 
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tuted a solar REC provision, requiring that an owner of a solar gene-
rating system who chooses to sell RECs “must first offer the credits for 
sale to an electricity supplier or electric company that shall apply 
them toward compliance with the renewable energy portfolio stan-
dard.”137
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The lawsuits in Massachusetts and Colorado have prompted 
commentators to question the soundness of other RPSs.138  These 
suits could therefore impact not only the challenged state law but also 
the remaining states with renewable energy laws and those consider-
ing one.139  The challenges were brought by entities with deep pock-
ets140 and a strong commitment to challenging similar laws.141
 
the electric distribution grid serving Maryland.”).  Prior to 2012, the requirement was stric-
ter:  
  With a 
lot of money at stake and future challenges to be expected, it would 
be prudent for Maryland to take another look at its law.    
On or before December 31, 2011, [solar energy] that is not connected with the 
electric distribution grid serving Maryland is eligible for inclusion in meeting the 
renewable energy portfolio standard only if offers for solar credits from Mary-
land grid sources are not made to the electricity supplier that would satisfy re-
quirements under the standard and only to the extent that such offers are not 
made. 
Id. § 7-704(a)(2)(i)(2).  
 137. Id. § 7-704(a)(2)(ii). 
 138. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1118–33 (pointing out vulnerabilities of RPSs in 
several states, including Nevada, Texas, New York, New Mexico, and others); Bev Pearman, 
Non-Profit Groups Challenge Colorado’s RES and Question Public Policy Favoring Wind Energy, 
RENEWABLE + LAW BLOG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com 
/tags/colorado-rps/ (posted by William H. Holmes) (“If plaintiffs are successful with their 
claims, then the states with RESs and [Renewable Portfolio Goal]s may have to modify 
their standards so they are not discriminating against out-of-state renewable energy gene-
rators.”).   
 139. Indiana, for example, is considering an RPS.  Press Release, Am. Wind Energy 
Ass’n, Gov. Mitch Daniels Signs Energy Bill With Voluntary Clean Energy Portfolio Stan-
dard for Indiana (May 11, 2011), available at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/partner/american-wind-energy-association/news/article/2011/05/gov-mitch-daniels-
signs-energy-bill-with-voluntary-clean-energy-portfolio-standard-for-indiana. 
 140. TransCanada, the challenger of the Massachusetts RPS, is the largest independent 
power producer in the Canadian province of Ontario.  Press Release, TransCanada, Tran-
sCanada Enters into Solar Generation (Dec. 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.transcanada.com/5911.html.  It operates the largest wind farm in Canada and 
New England.  Id.  Its third-quarter earnings in 2011 were $417 million.  Quarterly Report 
to Shareholders, TransCanada, TransCanada Reports an Increase in Third Quarter Com-
parable Earnings to $417 Million or $0.59 Per Share (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.transcanada.com/docs/Investor_Centre/TCC_-_Q3_11_-_11_01_11.pdf.  
 141. See Possible Outcomes, supra note 17.  
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The suits in Massachusetts and Colorado provide two different 
frameworks for analyzing Maryland’s RPS.  Under a narrow challenge, 
exemplified by TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. v. Bowles,142 a court 
would examine specific provisions of the Maryland law.143  In crafting 
the RPS, the Maryland legislature included incentives for renewable 
energy produced within a certain region,144 causing provisions of the 
law to discriminate on their face.145  Although promoting renewable 
energy provides legitimate health and environmental benefits, courts 
are likely to find that Maryland could achieve these benefits through 
less discriminatory means, thus concluding that portions of Mary-
land’s RPS are unconstitutional.146
In contrast, American Tradition Institute v. Colorado
   
147 represents a 
much broader challenge.148  Under this framework, which challenges 
the entire RPS, a court is unlikely to strike down the whole law as un-
constitutional.149  Nevertheless, state renewable energy laws like Mary-
land’s are too vital a policy tool to risk having even portions of them 
overturned by a court.  The state should therefore consider taking 
steps to preempt possible attacks.  While overhauling the entire RPS is 
not necessary, Maryland can follow Massachusetts’s lead and amend 
the most controversial provisions without significantly affecting the 
purpose of the law.150
A.  Commerce Clause as Applied to Maryland’s RPS 
   
If a company brought a challenge similar to TransCanada Power 
Marketing Ltd., a court is likely to find certain provisions of Maryland’s 
RPS unconstitutional.151  If an entity brought a broader challenge—
along the lines of American Tradition Institute—to Maryland’s RPS, a 
court is unlikely to find the entire law unconstitutional.152
 
 142. Complaint, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). 
   
 143. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 144. See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
 145. See infra Part II.A.1.a. 
 146. See infra Part II.A.1.b. 
 147. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-
KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011). 
 148. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 149. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 150. See infra Part II.B. 
 151. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 152. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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1.   A Specific Challenge to Maryland’s RPS Would Reveal Three 
Facially Discriminatory Provisions in Maryland’s Law 
A narrow challenge, as exemplified by TransCanada Marketing 
Ltd., would target the provisions of Maryland’s law that impose the 
greatest burden on interstate commerce.  The portions of Maryland’s 
law that risk being challenged as unconstitutional are (1) the re-
quirement that RPS-eligible facilities must be located within the PJM 
interconnection (hereinafter “the interconnection requirement”); 
(2) the solar REC requirement; and (3) the solar carve-out.153  When 
analyzing these provisions, a court would first determine whether the 
provisions discriminate on their face, triggering per-se invalidity, or 
whether they merely have a discriminatory effect, in which case a 
court would employ a balancing test.154  A court is likely to find that 
the provisions are facially discriminatory because they discriminate 
against renewable energy producers based on location.155
a.   Three of Maryland’s RPS Provisions Discriminate on Their 
Face 
   
A court is likely to find that all three of Maryland’s vulnerable 
provisions are facially discriminatory.  First, consider the interconnec-
tion requirement, which requires that all RPS-eligible facilities must 
be “located” either (a) “in the PJM region;” or (b) if they are located 
outside the PJM region they must be “in a control area that is adjacent 
to the PJM region, if the electricity is delivered into the PJM re-
gion.”156  By prefacing the interconnection provision with the word 
“located,” Maryland invites a Commerce Clause challenge.157
The PJM region is comprised of all or parts of thirteen states and 
Washington, D.C.
   
158
 
 153. All three of these requirements are described in detail above.  See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
  By limiting eligibility to renewable energy pro-
duced within the PJM region, the first interconnection provision dis-
criminates against all of thirty-seven states and parts of additional 
states.  The second clause of Maryland’s RPS reduces the number of 
 154. See supra Part I.A.  
 155. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978) (“[W]hatever New 
Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of 
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their 
origin, to treat them differently.”); see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing how laws that dis-
criminate against products based on their origins are facially discriminatory).  
 156. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. §§ 7-701(i)(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 157. Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1132–33. 
 158. About PJM: Who We Are, PJM.COM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm.aspx (last up-
dated Jan. 3, 2012).  
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states Maryland discriminates against but does not solve the prob-
lem.159  At best, part (b) includes generators located in most of the 
states east of Ohio but still “exclude[s] well over half of the United 
States based purely on location.”160  A court is likely to find that the 
interconnection requirement is facially discriminatory because sta-
tutes that discriminate against some states rather than all states still 
violate the Commerce Clause.161
Like the interconnection requirement, Maryland’s solar REC 
provision also facially discriminates against more than half of U.S. 
states.  Maryland requires that if an owner of a solar generating system 
chooses to sell RECs, “the owner must first offer the credits for sale to 
an electricity supplier or electric company that shall apply them to-
ward compliance with the [RPS].”
    
162  This requirement favors suppli-
ers based on location because the statute mandates that RPS-eligible 
facilities be located within or adjacent to Maryland’s electricity grid.163  
When the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a New Hamp-
shire law prohibiting hydroelectric plants from selling power out-of-
state before offering it in-state, the Court reasoned that “a State is 
without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being 
shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are 
required to satisfy local demands.”164
Finally, Maryland’s solar carve-out is also facially discriminatory.  
The carve-out requires RPS-eligible solar energy to be produced with-
in the electric distribution grid serving Maryland beginning in 
2012.
  Under the same reasoning, a 
court would find that Maryland’s solar REC provision improperly pre-
vents electricity from being sold freely in interstate commerce in an 
effort to satisfy the local demands for renewable energy created by the 
RPS.  The solar REC provision is facially discriminatory because the 
provision discriminates against half of the United States and prevents 
a product from freely entering interstate commerce.   
165
 
 159. Jacobi, supra note 
  This provision is even more discriminatory than the inter-
connection and solar REC provisions because it blocks solar energy 
produced in all of thirty-seven states.   
75, at 1132. 
 160. Id. at 1133.  See Electric Market National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview/elec-ovr-rto-
map.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (mapping United States electric grids).  
 161. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 162. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-704(a)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2010).  
 163. Id. §§ 7-701(i)(1)–(2). 
 164. New England Power v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982) (quoting Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 165. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. §§ 7-704(a)(2)(i)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
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b.   Under a Specific Challenge, a Court Could Find That 
Maryland’s RPS Fails Strict Scrutiny 
After determining that three provisions of Maryland’s law are fa-
cially discriminatory, a court would next apply strict scrutiny to de-
termine whether the provisions are constitutional.166  To withstand 
the first prong of a court’s scrutiny, Maryland must demonstrate that 
its law advances a legitimate purpose.167  A court is likely to find that 
Maryland’s goal of reducing emissions and promoting a healthy envi-
ronment is legitimate.168  By contrast, a court should not find Mary-
land’s energy-security goal legitimate.169  Under the second prong, a 
court would consider whether Maryland could achieve its legitimate 
purpose through less discriminatory means.170  Because Maryland 
could have pursued three less discriminatory alternatives that would 
have still allowed it to meet at least some of its goals, a court could 
find that certain provisions of Maryland’s law fail strict scrutiny.171
i.  Maryland’s RPS Advances a Legitimate Purpose  
  
Applying strict scrutiny, a court would begin by asking whether 
Maryland’s RPS advances a legitimate purpose.172  This prong consists 
of two parts: (1) the purpose must be legitimate; and (2) the law must 
actually advance that purpose.  According to the legislature, the pur-
pose of the RPS was to procure “the benefits of electricity from re-
newable energy resources, including long-term decreased emissions, a 
healthier environment, increased energy security, and decreased re-
liance on and vulnerability from imported energy sources.”173
 
 166. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“[F]acial discrimination 
invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose . . . .”). 
   
 167. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 
(1994) (“[T]he [law] must be invalidated unless . . . it advances a legitimate local pur-
pose . . . .” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  See supra note 54 for a description of how the standard 
courts apply to facially discriminatory laws differs from the traditional strict scrutiny stan-
dard.  
 168. See infra Part II.A.1.b.i. 
 169. See infra Part II.A.1.b.i. 
 170. See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (“[F]acial discrimination invokes the strictest scru-
tiny of . . . the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”). 
 171. See infra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 172. See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (“[F]acial discrimination invokes the strictest scru-
tiny of any purported legitimate local purpose . . . .”). 
 173. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-702(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
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Maryland’s first and second goals—decreased emissions and a 
healthier environment—are environmental and public health goals174 
that a court would consider against the backdrop of recent Supreme 
Court cases.  The Court has recognized that the preservation of the 
environment and public health are legitimate goals.  In New Energy Co. 
of Indiana v. Limbach, for example, the state argued that its law discri-
minating against interstate commerce was justified because it encour-
aged the use of ethanol in gasoline in place of lead, thereby reducing 
harmful exhaust emissions.175  Although the Court ultimately invali-
dated the law, it conceded that “[c]ertainly the protection of health is 
a legitimate state goal.”176  As in Limbach, Maryland may also claim 
that its goal of reducing harmful emissions is legitimate.  Renewable 
energy produces no emissions, while traditional energy sources pro-
duce harmful air and water emissions.  Thus, a court can be expected 
to find that Maryland’s environmental and health goals are legiti-
mate.177
A court would also likely find that Maryland’s RPS will in fact ad-
vance these legitimate environmental and health goals.  Like in Mas-
sachusetts and Colorado, the Maryland RPS relies on tradable 
RECs.
   
178  Most REC schemes allow “retailers to purchase RECs from 
renewable energy generators and submit them annually to state regu-
lators.”179  Under a traditional REC scheme, therefore, a state cannot 
guarantee that the local benefits of renewable energy—decreased 
emissions, a healthier environment—will accrue in-state.180  The re-
gional requirements, however, ensure that renewable energy is pro-
duced in-state or within the region.181
 
 174. The environmental goals of “long-term decreased emissions [and] a healthier en-
vironment” directly contribute to improvements in public health.  See North Carolina ex 
rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821–23 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (finding 
that emissions from electric power plants are “certain to cause premature mortality in hu-
mans,” as well as other negative health impacts), rev’d on other grounds, 615 F.3d 291 (4th 
Cir. 2010).  This Comment will refer to these goals interchangeably as “environmental 
goals” and “environmental and health goals.”  
   
 175. 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988). 
 176. Id. at 279–80. 
 177. See id. at 279 (“Certainly the protection of health is a legitimate state goal, and we 
assume for purposes of this argument that use of ethanol generally furthers it.”).    
 178. See HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 5 table 1 (demonstrating that the RPSs of Mas-
sachusetts, Colorado, and Maryland all require RECs).  
 179. Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1111; see also supra Part I.B.1.  
 180. See Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1095–96 (discussing the difficulty of proving the in-
state accrual of benefits without limiting the location of eligible renewable energy).  
 181. See id. at 1096 (“The obvious method to guarantee that benefits accrue in-state is to 
limit the location of renewable generators eligible to participate in the RPS-created market 
either to the state or immediate regional area.”).  
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Locally generated renewable energy will offset the need for tradi-
tional energy facilities in Maryland182 and the entire PJM region.  Air 
and water do not recognize state boundaries; an improvement in air 
and water quality outside Maryland could improve Maryland’s envi-
ronment, especially if those improvements take place near Mary-
land.183
Maryland also takes the threat of climate change very seriously
  Thus, the very language that makes Maryland’s RPS facially 
discriminatory also enables the RPS to achieve the legislature’s stated 
environmental and health goals.  
184 
and its goal of reducing emissions would surely include minimizing 
the state’s contribution to climate change.  Climate change is a global 
phenomenon,185 thus any decrease in emissions within Maryland and 
the surrounding region would decrease overall emissions that result 
in climate change.186
A court is unlikely to find that Maryland’s third and fourth 
goals—energy security and decreased reliance on imported energy 
sources—are legitimate.  These goals are very similar in effect and 
would be analyzed together.  Here, the legislature’s exact intent is 
unclear; the goals could be interpreted to apply to the state of Mary-
land or to the country as a whole.  Maryland relies on coal to generate 
more than 50 percent of its electricity, but “most of the State’s coal-
  A court could therefore determine that Mary-
land’s RPS helps reduce climate change.  
 
 182. Maryland has six coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 400 megawatts and 
above.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES 2010, at 
121 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/sep2009.pdf.  
 183. According to Neil Donahue, a chemistry professor at Carnegie Mellon University, 
“smoke from a Pittsburgh-area smokestack can surf the wind eastward then bend south 
along the East Coast, [passing through Maryland and] eventually turning west toward Ba-
ton Rouge where it swings northward through the Midwest before prevailing winds can 
carry it back through Pennsylvania.”  David Templeton & Don Hopey, Wind and Terrain 
Play a Role in ‘Transport’ Pollution, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10349/1109207-114.stm.  Because of these wind pat-
terns, Maryland receives pollution from as far away as Pennsylvania and other eastern 
states.  Transport pollution is such a strong concern that EPA recently announced a rule 
limiting the interstate transport of emissions of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide.  Fed-
eral Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Correction of SIP  Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (proposed Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).  
 184. Through its CO2 Budget Trading Program, Maryland is a member of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a regional carbon trading scheme.  MD. CODE REGS. 26.09 
(2011).  The legislature passed the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Act in 2009.  MD 
CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-1200 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011).  
 185. See SOLOMON, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing the global nature of climate change). 
 186. As is true throughout this section, whether Maryland could have achieved these 
goals through other, less discriminatory, means will be discussed below.  See supra Part 
II.A.1.b.  
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fired power plants burn coal shipped from West Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania.”187  If the Maryland legislature’s purpose was to reduce Mary-
land’s reliance on West Virginia and Pennsylvania coal, it would seem 
to be exactly the type of isolationist behavior the dormant Commerce 
Clause was designed to prevent.188  Under the alternative interpreta-
tion—wherein the legislature meant to decrease reliance on foreign 
sources of energy and increase the energy security of the United 
States—a court is also likely to find the goal invalid.  To satisfy the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,189 a state must meet additional 
requirements beyond what is necessary to satisfy the dormant Inter-
state Commerce Clause.190
ii.  Maryland Has Less Discriminatory Alternatives 
  Because the energy-security goal is invalid 
under the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause, it cannot be valid 
under the stricter dormant Foreign Commerce Clause test.  
A court must next consider the second prong of the strict scruti-
ny test: whether Maryland can meet its legitimate goals through less 
discriminatory means.191
 
 187. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, MARYLAND ENERGY FACT SHEET, 
http://www.eia.gov/state/state-energy-profiles.cfm?sid=MD (last updated Nov. 2009).  
  If Maryland is able to meet its legitimate en-
vironmental and health goals by pursuing an alternative that is less 
discriminatory, the state will not satisfy the lack-of-alternatives excep-
tion.  A court is likely to find that Maryland has three less discrimina-
tory means to achieve its goals.  The state could (1) implement a sys-
tem based on electricity bundled with the attributes of renewable 
energy instead of relying on RECs; (2) emphasize the delivery of ben-
efits over the physical location of generators; and (3) strike the inter-
connection requirement entirely.  Because Maryland has alternative 
 188. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988) (the 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state 
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors”). 
 189. The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is the analogue of the dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause (commonly referred to, and referred to in this Comment, as the dor-
mant Commerce Clause).  See supra note 35.   
 190. In addition to satisfying the requirements of the dormant Interstate Commerce 
Clause, a state measure that impacts foreign commerce may not increase the risk of mul-
tiple taxation or impair the nation’s ability to “speak with one voice” in foreign affairs.  
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446–49 (1979) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). 
 191. The only decision in which the Court concluded that the lack-of-alternatives prong 
was satisfied was Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).  There, the Court focused on 
“whether scientifically accepted techniques exist for the sampling and inspection of live 
baitfish.”  Id. at 146.  Because no techniques had been developed, Maine had no alterna-
tives to ensure that imported baitfish were not infected with parasites or nonnative species.  
Id. at 147, 151.   
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means to achieve its goals, a court could find that provisions of Mary-
land’s RPS fail strict scrutiny. 
States have two options when shaping the RPS obligation: (1) a 
bundled system or (2) a REC-based system.192  Maryland chose the 
REC-based option and wrote additional regional requirements into 
the law.193  Instead of relying on RECs, Maryland could have imple-
mented a system based on electricity bundled with the attributes of 
renewable energy.194  By definition, only generators in the region (or 
close enough to deliver energy into the region) can offer bundled 
electricity.195  Bundled energy and attributes therefore assure “that 
environmental benefits will accrue to the state or region in which the 
RPS is established.”196
In an influential industry treatise, scholars Nancy Rader and 
Scott Hempling argue that courts will not apply strict scrutiny to an 
RPS that bases eligibility on a generator’s ability to produce benefits 
for a state (instead of basing it on the origin of the electricity).
   
197  
They argue that “[a]lthough such a policy clearly will exclude distant 
generators, the exclusion will occur not because those generators are 
located in another state, but because their physical circumstances 
preclude benefits to the state.   This feature avoids the facial discrimi-
nation attack which makes explicit location requirements vulnera-
ble.”198
In lieu of switching to a different system, Maryland has two alter-
natives under its current REC-based system.  The first possible alterna-
tive under a REC-based system would be for Maryland to focus on de-
livery of benefits rather than physical location of the generator.  The 
statute’s current interconnection requirement defines a REC as elec-
  Under a bundled system, generators are RPS-eligible not 
based on their location but because they provide benefits to the state.  
The system is therefore a less discriminatory alternative, and so Mary-
land is likely to fail the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.  
 
 192. See RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 73, at 55; see also supra Part I.B.1. 
 193. See HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 5 table 1 (demonstrating that the Maryland 
RPS requires RECs).  The three constitutionally suspect provisions within Maryland’s 
RPS—the interconnection requirement, solar REC requirement, and solar carve-out—all 
contain regional requirements that favor suppliers and generators based within the PJM 
region.  This Comment refers to all three provisions collectively as “regional require-
ments.”  
 194. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 195. HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 3.  
 196. Id. 
 197. See RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 73, at A-3 (arguing that this approach “avoids 
the facial discrimination attack which makes explicit location requirements vulnerable”). 
 198. Id. 
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tricity derived from a renewable source that “is located: (1) in the PJM 
region or in a state that is adjacent to the PJM region; or (2) outside 
the area described in item (1) . . . but in a control area that is adja-
cent to the PJM region, if the electricity is delivered into the PJM re-
gion.”199  Since laws that discriminate against a product based solely 
on location are facially discriminatory,200 it is unfortunate that the 
Maryland legislature prefaced the entire interconnection require-
ment with the discriminatory word “located.”201
In part (2) of the interconnection requirement, however, the leg-
islature introduced a delivery component.  Emphasizing the delivery 
of benefits is far less discriminatory than focusing on the location of 
an energy producer because such focus merely makes the region sur-
rounding the enacting state “a more attractive market for renewable 
energy generation in the same way as would a tax break offered to 
those who sell to or locate within the state.”
   
202
Amending the interconnection requirement would also lessen 
the burden placed on interstate commerce by the solar REC require-
ment and the solar carve-out.  The solar REC requirement would not 
discriminate on its face since that provision is only constitutionally 
suspect because it is tied to the interconnection requirement.
  By eliminating the “lo-
cation” language and emphasizing the existing delivery component, 
Maryland’s RPS would not contain the suspect location-based lan-
guage while still meeting the goals of reducing regional emissions and 
promoting a healthy environment.    
203  The 
solar carve-out, however, contains location-specific language.204
 
 199. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-701(i)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis add-
ed). 
  Nev-
ertheless, like the interconnection requirement, the solar carve-out 
provision would cease to be facially discriminatory if the Maryland 
legislature changed the emphasis from the location of the solar ener-
 200. See supra Part I.A.1.  
 201. See Jacobi, supra note 75, at 1132–33 (arguing that Maryland’s RPS focuses on in-
region location to its detriment). 
 202. See id. at 1117 (quoting RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 73, at A-4) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (describing the benefits of bundled regional limits disguised as eligi-
bility based on in-state benefit delivery).  
 203. Maryland requires that if an owner of a solar generating system chooses to sell 
RECs, “the owner must first offer the credits for sale to an electricity supplier or electric 
company that shall apply them toward compliance with the [RPS].”  PUB. UTIL. § 7-
704(a)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2010).  Because RPS-eligible facilities must be located within 
Maryland’s electricity grid, requiring an owner of a solar generating system to first offer 
the credits to an eligible electricity supplier favors suppliers within the PJM grid. 
 204. It requires that RPS-eligible solar energy be produced within the electric distribu-
tion grid serving Maryland.  Id. § 7-704(a)(2)(i)(1). 
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gy produced to the ability of the producer to deliver the solar energy 
to the region.205
The second possible REC-based alternative would involve striking 
the regional requirements entirely.  By striking the regional require-
ments, Maryland would rid the RPS of the three facially discriminato-
ry provisions and eliminate any danger that its law violates the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.  Striking these requirements, however, 
would only allow Maryland to meet its large-scale goal of reducing 
climate change
   
206 and would preclude the state from receiving any lo-
calized benefits of renewable energy.207  Although air and water do 
not respect geographic boundaries, Maryland is more likely to enjoy a 
cleaner environment if renewable energy replaces traditional energy 
within the surrounding region.208
2.  A Broad Challenge to Maryland’s RPS Is Unlikely to Succeed 
  Thus, while a challenger may argue 
that Maryland could achieve its legitimate goal of reducing climate 
change by eliminating the regional requirements, the state could 
strongly counter that it cannot achieve any localized environmental 
and health benefits without some form of regional restrictions.  Eli-
minating the regional requirements entirely, therefore, is not a viable 
alternative.  
A broader challenge to Maryland’s RPS, as exemplified by Ameri-
can Tradition Institute v. Colorado, could have more sweeping effects 
than a narrow suit.  A suit similar to that brought by ATI would chal-
lenge the entire law as facially discriminatory, argue that the purpose 
of the law renders it invalid, and introduce a charge that the law im-
permissibly regulates out-of-state business conduct.209
 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 
  When analyz-
ing these broad allegations, it is necessary to discount the discrimina-
tory provisions discussed in Part II.A.1 and consider the law as a 
whole.  Once a court takes this approach, it should find that, at most, 
the law has an incidental effect on commerce, but not that it is facially 
202.  
 206. Because climate change is a global phenomenon, a reduction anywhere will de-
crease the amount of greenhouse gas emissions overall.  See Solomon, supra note 9, at 2 
(discussing the global nature of climate change). 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 208. A renewable energy source in a nearby state is likely to produce more benefits for 
Maryland because of its close proximity, as compared to a far-away source.  See RADER & 
HEMPLING, supra note 73, at A-5 (noting that the benefits of renewables are not easily con-
fined to a single state).  But see New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 
(1988) (noting that out-of-state ethanol provides no fewer health benefits than in-state 
ethanol).   
 209. See infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing ATI’s challenge to the Colorado RPS).   
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discriminatory.  Here, the more lenient Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. ba-
lancing test210 would apply, and a court is likely to find that the bene-
fits of the law outweigh any incidental burdens.211  A court should not 
find that the law’s purpose unconstitutionally discriminates against 
interstate commerce because the law achieves more than simple eco-
nomic protectionism.212  Finally, a court is unlikely to find that the 
Maryland law impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct since 
Maryland treats in-state companies the same as out-of-state compa-
nies.213
a.   Maryland’s RPS in Its Entirety Burdens Commerce 
Incidentally, if at All 
  
A challenge similar to the Colorado lawsuit would first claim that 
Maryland’s entire RPS is unconstitutional because it prohibits energy 
suppliers from putting a certain amount of electricity from fossil fuel 
sources into the grid.214  In Maryland’s case, the claim would be that 
by 2022, utilities supplying electricity to the interstate grid would be 
burdened because 20 percent of their energy could not come from 
fossil fuels.215  In essence, the law manipulates the market for clean 
energy by requiring a certain percentage of renewable energy regard-
less of the price.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, a court would consider whether the law burdens inter-
state commerce and, if so, to what extent.216  Although, as discussed, a 
court could find provisions of the law facially discriminatory,217 it is un-
likely that a court would find that the entire law discriminates on its 
face.  Requiring a certain amount of renewable energy sets up no bar-
riers to commerce based on the origin of the energy, does not mani-
pulate the price of out-of-state versus in-state goods, and does not at-
tempt to regulate out-of-state conduct.218
A court would next determine whether a law that encourages a 
certain type of good has an incidental effect on commerce.  In Exxon 
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, the Court upheld a law that favored one 
   
 
 210. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 211. See infra Part II.A.2.a. 
 212. See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 213. See infra Part II.A.2.c. 
 214. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at Part II.A, Am. Tradi-
tion Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).   
 215. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-703(b)(17) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 216. See supra Part I.A (outlining the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence).   
 217. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 218. See supra Part I.A.1 (providing examples of facially discriminatory laws that fit into 
these categories).  
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type of interstate petroleum refiners over another by barring the dis-
favored type from owning retail stores in Maryland.219  Because Mary-
land had no oil refiners, the law affected only out-of-state compa-
nies.220  Regardless, the Court found no discrimination, explaining 
that “the Act create[d] no barriers whatsoever against interstate [pe-
troleum] dealers.”221  Similarly, the RPS scheme encourages one type 
of energy over another, but it treats all energy companies the same.  
The RPS as a whole does not bar any out-of-state electric company 
from doing business in Maryland.  Instead, it merely requires that 
companies who want to do business in Maryland derive 20 percent of 
their electricity from renewable sources by 2022.222
While a court could conclude that Maryland’s RPS does not dis-
criminate at all, it could also find that it incidentally burdens certain 
interstate companies.  After all, to comply with Maryland’s law, com-
panies must purchase RECs, which tend to be more expensive than 
traditional energy.
   
223  Laws with merely incidental effects are properly 
analyzed under the Pike balancing test.224
Under Pike, local benefits, such as improving environmental 
health and safety, outweigh an incidental burden on commerce.
   
225  In 
United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Manage-
ment Authority, for example, the Court examined a flow-control ordin-
ance that required trash haulers to deliver solid waste to an in-state 
waste processing facility.226
 
 219. 437 U.S. 117, 119–21 (1978).  
  The Court applied the Pike balancing test 
 220. Id. at 125–26. 
 221. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).  The Court continued:  
While the refiners will no longer enjoy their same status in the Maryland market, 
in-state independent dealers will have no competitive advantage over out-of-state 
dealers.  The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate 
companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against inter-
state commerce. 
Id. 
 222. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-703(b)(17) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 223. See OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
GUIDE TO PURCHASING GREEN POWER: RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CERTIFICATES, AND ON-SITE RENEWABLE GENERATION 7 (2010) (explaining that RECs tend 
to be more expensive than conventional energy sources). 
 224. See supra note 56.   
 225. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–74 (1981) 
(upholding a Minnesota statute banning the use of environmentally harmful plastic milk 
containers). 
 226. 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).  The Court did not strike down the law as facially discri-
minatory, which it effectively was, because it fit into the market-participant exception to 
the Commerce Clause.  Id.  For a discussion of the market-participant exception, see supra 
note 38.  
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and concluded that the benefits of the ordinance—increased recy-
cling, among other benefits—outweighed the burdens.227
b.  The Purpose of Maryland’s Law Is Constitutional 
  The effect 
on interstate commerce in that case was more substantial than here 
because the law at issue in United Haulers clearly favored in-state facili-
ties.  Maryland’s RPS as a whole does not favor in-state facilities, and a 
court is likely to find that Maryland’s legitimate environmental and 
health goals outweigh any burden on commerce created by the entire 
RPS.  
Maryland’s RPS would also likely survive allegations that the pur-
pose of the RPS facially discriminates against electricity generators 
operating outside of state borders.228  Like Colorado229 and other 
states,230 Maryland included the economic benefits of renewable 
energy in its statement of purpose.231  While the dormant Commerce 
Clause prohibits “simple economic protectionism,”232 the analysis 
does not end there.  In addition to the economic impacts of the RPS, 
the Maryland legislature also stressed the law’s environmental and 
health benefits.233  Although courts carefully scrutinize the stated 
purpose of a law,234
 
 227. 550 U.S. at 346–47.  The Court emphasized that the ordinances allowed the coun-
ties to finance their waste disposal services while also increasing recycling and conferring 
significant health and environmental benefits.  Id.  
 they do not do so in a vacuum.  If Maryland 
claimed to have enacted the RPS because of a concern for the envi-
ronment without ever having taken an interest in the environment 
 228. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at Part II.B, Am. Tradi-
tion Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).   
 229. See supra note 124.   
 230. See, e.g., 26 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 351(b) (2009) (“The General Assembly finds 
and declares that the benefits of electricity from renewable energy resources . . . in-
clude . . . new economic development opportunities.”).  
 231. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-702(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (“It is the intent of 
the General Assembly to . . . recognize the economic, environmental, fuel diversity, and se-
curity benefits of renewable energy resources . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 232. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 231. 
 234. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 107–08 
(1994) (explaining that characterizing its surcharge on in-state disposal of out-of-state 
waste as “resource protectionism” did not validate the discriminatory statute); New Energy 
Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988) (recognizing that the protection of 
health is a legitimate state goal but finding that health was “merely an occasional and acci-
dental effect of achieving . . . [the law’s] purpose, favorable tax treatment for . . . ethanol 
[produced in-state]”); Dean Milk Co. v.  City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (ex-
plaining that Madison cannot discriminate against interstate commerce “even in the exer-
cise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives . . . are available”). 
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previously, a court would have good reason to suspect the claim.  
Maryland, however, has shown a strong commitment to environmen-
tal issues.  It is part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,235 and 
it has taken great strides to clean up emissions from cars and tradi-
tional energy sources.236
A court could even find that Maryland’s economic goals are legi-
timate benefits.  Since encouraging certain types of energy has, at 
most, incidental effects on interstate commerce, Pike is the appropri-
ate test to apply.  In United Haulers, the Court upheld a discriminatory 
ordinance under the Pike test because the benefits of the ordinance, 
which included financing a municipal service, outweighed any inci-
dental burdens on interstate commerce.
  Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find 
Maryland’s environmental goals illegitimate.  
237  While emphasizing that 
“revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce,” the Court explained that revenue 
generation could be considered a cognizable benefit for purposes of 
the Pike test.238
c.   Maryland’s RPS Does Not Attempt to Regulate Extraterritorial 
Conduct 
  Thus it is unlikely that a court would find the stated 
purposes of Maryland’s law to be unconstitutional.  
Using ATI’s suit as a guide, one may argue that Maryland’s RPS 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause by impermissibly regulating 
out-of-state conduct.239  These types of claims have often arisen in Cal-
ifornia,240
 
 235. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a cooperative effort among several 
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states, including Maryland, at capping and reducing “CO2 
emissions from the power sector 10 percent by 2018.”  The Initiative’s homepage can be 
found at http://rggi.org/.    
 which has unusual sway because of the size of its econo-
 236. See MD. CODE ANN., ENV. §§ 2-1001 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011) (Healthy 
Air Act targeting emissions from traditional energy sources); MD. CODE REGS. 26.09 
(2011) (Maryland CO2 Budget Trading Program Rules);  MD. CODE REGS. 26.11.34 (2011) 
(Clean Cars Program).  
 237. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 346 (2007) (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances impose any 
incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden does not exceed 
the public benefits of the ordinances.”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Cf. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶ 75, Am. Tradi-
tion Inst. v. Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).   
 240. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, 
2011 WL 6934797, at *12–15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011). 
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my.241  An Eastern District of California court recently struck down a 
state law that attempted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
ethanol used to make gasoline.242  California did not produce etha-
nol.  Therefore, the law, which favored ethanol produced a certain 
way, had the effect of regulating out-of-state ethanol producers.243  In 
contrast to the California ethanol law, Maryland’s RPS affects energy 
generators with plants inside—as well as outside—Maryland’s bor-
ders.244
A Colorado-type challenge to Maryland’s RPS based on regula-
tion of out-of-state conduct would also likely fail because of a differ-
ence between the two laws.  The Colorado RPS authorizes the use of 
tradable RECs but mandates that definitions of “renewable energy” be 
identical to those set out in the Colorado law.
  Maryland also has less of an impact on the conduct of other 
states than California due to the much smaller size of its economy.  
Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would find that Maryland’s RPS 
impermissibly regulates out-of-state conduct.  
245  While Maryland’s 
law, like Colorado’s, relies on RECs, Maryland has no similar provi-
sion requiring that the definition of “renewable energy” be identical 
to those set out in the Maryland law.246
In sum, under a challenge similar to American Tradition Institute, a 
court would apply the more lenient Pike test and conclude that, on 
balance, the burden placed on commerce by Maryland’s RPS is out-
weighed by the environmental and health benefits it provides.  It 
should not find the statement of purpose, which includes an econom-
ic benefit, fatal to the RPS because the law is aimed at achieving legi-
timate environmental goals in addition to improving the economy.  
Finally, a court should not find that the RPS has the effect of regulat-
  Thus, regardless of whether 
ATI’s claim against Colorado has merit, Maryland’s law does not have 
the same provision and is not susceptible to the same challenge.   
 
 241. See California’s Economy Dips to No. 9 in World, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2012/01/13/4184193/californias-economy-dips-to-no.html (re-
porting that California is the ninth biggest economy in the world).  
 242. Goldstene, 2011 WL 6934797, at *16 (concluding that California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard impermissibly controlled conduct outside of its borders). 
 243. Id. at *13–15. 
 244. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 245. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-124(1)(d) (“The commission shall not restrict the 
qualifying retail utility’s ownership of renewable energy credits if the qualifying retail utili-
ty . . . uses definitions of eligible energy resources that are limited to those identified in 
paragraph (a) [defining renewable energy] of this subsection.”).  
 246. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (outlining 
Colorado’s REC requirement), with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-701 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(no similar REC requirement).  
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ing out-of state companies because it has little impact on their con-
duct.  Thus, Maryland would prevail under a broad challenge.  
B.  State Action to Amend Maryland’s Statute 
As challenges to state RPSs mount, it is prudent for Maryland to 
take another look at its law.  Although the federal government could 
take action,247
As discussed, Maryland has three alternatives to its current RPS.  
First, it could switch from a REC-based system to a system that relies 
on energy bundled with the attributes of renewable energy.
 the Maryland legislature, which revisited the law as re-
cently as 2010, is best suited to head off any potential challenges.  The 
General Assembly should start with the three facially discriminatory 
provisions.   
248
 
 247. While a longer discussion of Congress’s authority to ensure that renewable energy 
laws like Maryland’s are found to be constitutional is outside the scope of this Comment, 
the federal government has two options.  First it could pass a federal renewable energy 
standard, which would preempt state RPSs.  Second, it could authorize discriminatory state 
RPSs.   
  While 
Although Congress could pass a federal RPS, it is unlikely that any such bill would 
pass given the current political climate.  See, e.g., Transparency in Regulatory Analysis of 
Impacts on the Nation (TRAIN) Act of 2011, H.R. 2401, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring 
the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before implement-
ing new regulations); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act of 
2011, H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring Congress to vote on all new major rules of 
the executive branch).  If Congress did pass a federal RPS, it would probably be less strin-
gent than most state RPSs.  To pass, it would most likely act as a ceiling, requiring states 
with strong RPSs to lower their standards.  Although the regulation could potentially act as 
a floor preemption, this option would also have flaws.  States would enact stronger RPSs, 
and in doing so would continue their attempts to preserve the economic and environmen-
tal benefits for their own states.  Thus, a floor preemption would likely do nothing to alle-
viate current Commerce Clause issues.  See Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation 
of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 371 (“[A]llowing a 
national RPS to preempt unconstitutional state protectionist measures may be one of the 
more significant benefits offered by a national RPS.”). 
In the alternative, Congress could pass a law approving of certain discriminatory 
RPSs, as it has done with insurance.  See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of 
California, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981) (“Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations 
on the authority of the States to regulate and tax the business of insurance when it passed 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . .”).  While such a law would face political challenges simi-
lar to passing a federal RPS, the preemption issue would not be as problematic.  New 
Hampshire has argued that Congress essentially approved of discriminatory RPSs when it 
established the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  The Supreme Court dismissed 
this argument so quickly, however, that it is very unlikely this particular argument could be 
resurrected.  See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340–41 (1982) 
(“Congress did no more than leave standing whatever valid state laws then existed [and] 
intended only that its legislation ‘take no authority from state commissions.’” (alterations 
and emphasis omitted)). 
 248. See supra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 884 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:848 
this approach would assure that benefits accrue locally,249 it would 
compel Maryland to completely rewrite its law.  In addition, a REC-
based system has certain advantages over bundled renewable electrici-
ty.  RECs are easily tracked for RPS compliance purposes250 and allow 
more flexibility than bundled electricity and attributes.  It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that most states with RPSs favor a system involving 
tradable RECs.251
To keep its current REC-based system, Maryland legislators have 
two options.  They can eliminate the regional requirement entirely or 
they can emphasize the delivery of benefits over the location of the 
electricity generation.  Eliminating the regional requirements is less 
desirable because it will reduce Maryland’s ability to guarantee that 
the environmental and health benefits accrue locally.
   
252  While im-
provements to air and water quality outside Maryland could improve 
the state’s environment,253 the current regional requirements incor-
porate energy produced in states as far away from Maryland as Ohio.  
The benefits to Maryland of renewable energy generated farther west 
than Ohio are too indirect to be relied upon.  Thus, the second REC-
based option is Maryland’s best choice.  Only by emphasizing delivery 
over location can Maryland’s RPS survive a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge and ensure that benefits accrue in-state or in-region.254
By focusing on benefit-delivery and not location, Maryland’s RPS 
will continue to impact interstate commerce to some extent.  Without 
the facially discriminatory provisions, however, the law would be ana-
lyzed under the Pike balancing test—the same test a court would apply 
if faced with a broad challenge to Maryland’s RPS.
 
255
Although a broad challenge is unlikely to succeed, the state can 
take a simple step to reduce the chance of a broad attack, by revising 
  Under this 
more lenient test, Maryland would very likely prevail.  The environ-
mental and health benefits the RPS provides for Maryland would 
outweigh any impact on interstate commerce.  
 
 249. See supra text accompanying note 196.  
 250. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the difficulties of tracking bundled electricity in 
power pool arrangements; see also HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 3 (discussing the bene-
fits of RECs).  
 251. See HOLT & WISER, supra note 76, at 4 (explaining that most states allow RECs for 
RPS compliance purposes).  
 252. See supra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 253. See supra note 183.  
 254. The revised provision could define an REC as “1 megawatt-hour of electricity that 
is derived from a renewable source that delivers electricity into the PJM region.” 
 255. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how a court, using the Pike standard, would dismiss 
a broad challenge to Maryland’s RPS).  
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its statement of purpose.  While the statement should not dictate the 
outcome of a challenge, the Colorado suit demonstrates that when a 
state legislature takes economic considerations into account, the law 
becomes an easier target.  While stressing the economic benefits of 
renewable energy might have helped legislators pass the RPS initial-
ly,256
III.  CONCLUSION 
 now that Maryland’s law is on the books, the state will receive the 
economic benefits regardless of the stated purpose.  Revising the 
purpose is an easy step the legislature can take to reduce the risk of a 
challenge. 
Renewable energy is a multi-billion-dollar industry.  With so 
much at stake, challenges like those in Massachusetts and Colorado 
are not surprising and can be expected in the future.  Maryland is 
among the twenty-nine states with RPS legislation, all of which are 
vulnerable to a certain extent.257  A court could find that certain pro-
visions of Maryland’s RPS law are unconstitutional because the law fa-
vors renewable energy generated within a defined region.258  Al-
though courts could overlook the constitutional defects of the RPS by 
focusing on the benefits of renewable energy, they are more likely to 
find that Maryland could continue to receive the benefits of renewa-
ble energy through less discriminatory means.259  State renewable 
energy laws like Maryland’s are too vital to risk having any provisions 
of them overturned by a court.  Given the recent challenges to state 
RPSs, Maryland should consider taking steps today to preempt possi-
ble attacks.  While abandoning the entire RPS is far from necessary, 
the state should keep its REC-based system but emphasize the delivery 
of benefits over the location of the energy source.  Finally, Maryland 
should revisit its statement of purpose.260
 
   
 
 256. Press Release, Office of Governor Martin O’Malley, Governor Martin O’Malley Re-
leases Clean Energy Agenda to Promote Jobs, Sustainability (Jan. 15, 2010) (stressing the 
economic and job-growth benefits of the Maryland RPS).  
 257. See supra note 3 (listing the twenty-nine states with RPSs).   
 258. See supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that provisions of Maryland’s RPS are unconstitution-
al); see also supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that the broad RPS system is constitutional).  
 259. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 260. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
